The financing of young firms. How persistent are borrowing constraints? by Fjærli, Erik & Iancu, Diana
Discussion 
Papers
Statistics Norway
Research department
No. 707 •
October 2012
Erik Fjærli and Diana Iancu
The fi nancing of young fi rms
How persistent are borrowing constraints?
Discussion Papers No. 707, October 2012 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Erik Fjærli and Diana Iancu 
The financing of young firms 
How persistent are borrowing constraints? 
Abstract: 
Are investments by new firms constrained by access to financing? If so, are the constraints 
persistent or do firms overcome their financing problems during the first years of operation? We 
examine the role of capital constraints by estimating the relation between founders’ initial wealth and 
firm size during the first years of operation. Similar to previous studies, we find a positive impact of 
entrepreneurs’ wealth prior to start-up on the start-up size of entrepreneurial firms, but this effect 
decreases during the first five years of operation. We also document a high degree of economic 
mobility among entrepreneurial firms during the first years of operation. This is primarily driven by a 
disproportional increase in debt financing among the smallest firms, indicating that capital constraints 
for entrepreneurs are transitory. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, borrowing constraints, growth 
JEL classification: L11 
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge financial support from the Norwegian Research Council. We 
thank Rolf Aaberge and Arvid Raknerud for valuable comments. Also thanks to Vesa Kanniainen for 
comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
Address: Erik Fjærli, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: efi@ssb.no 
Diana Iancu, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: cri@ssb.no 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
© Statistics Norway 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers 
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
Statistics Norway 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
E-mail: Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
 
ISSN 0809-733X 
Print: Statistics Norway 
3 
Sammendrag 
Vi undersøker om investeringer i nyetablerte foretak er beskranket av tilgang til finansiering. Våre 
resultater viser at det kan være vanskelig å få fullfinansiert nye foretak i kapitalmarkedet, men at 
finansieringssituasjonen bedres i løpet av de første 5 driftsårene. Dette medfører kraftig vekst i de 
minste foretakene og en høy grad av omrangering målt ved bokført verdi. Mannlige gründere starter 
gjennomgående større foretak, og med sterkere vekst enn kvinnelige. 
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1. Introduction 
To identify the different aspects of progress in young firms and the determinants of growth is not an 
easy task. In this paper we examine more closely the evolution of young firms by means of a broad set 
of empirical measures that provide more insight in the evolution from start-up to a going firm. Our 
main focus is on the role of possible borrowing constraints for young firms at start-up and to what 
extent such constraints on size are persistent. More precisely, we examine two research questions: 
First, how do the founders’ resources affect start- up size and early growth in firms, both on average 
and with regard to the firms’ location in the size distribution? Second, to what extent do young small 
firms catch up with larger ones during the first years of operation?  
 
Government programmes to foster entrepreneurship implicitly or explicitly assume that capital 
constraints hinder entrepreneurship. Indeed, many studies do find empirical evidence that financial 
constraints may restrict investments − in particular among young firms. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) 
find a one-to-one relationship between increments of internal cash flow and small firms’ investment 
and interpret this as an indication that the growth of small firms is constrained by internal finance. 
DeAngelo et al (2006) find that the propensity to pay dividends is increasing in the earned/contributed 
capital ratio. This indicates that internal cash flow is scarce and valuable to the firm, causing firms to 
postpone dividends until they reach a desired level of capital.   
 
These findings are consistent with the model set up in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), who predict that 
the propensity to start a business should be positively related to founder’s wealth. Several empirical 
studies find a positive relationship between the propensity to start a business and household wealth 
and conclude that liquidity constraints can be an obstacle for business start-up.1 On the other hand, 
when focusing on the incremental impact of household wealth on the probability of starting a business, 
which should be a decreasing function of wealth according to the Evans-Jovanovic model, Hurst and 
Lusardi (2004) find no evidence that liquidity constraints represent any obstacle to entrepreneurship.  
 
As pointed out by Cabral and Mata (2003) and Hvide and Møen (2010), the Evans-Jovanovic model 
also implies that there may be a positive relation between start-up size and entrepreneurs’ wealth. 
However, even if liquidity constraints may lead to a sub-optimal start-up size, access to external 
capital may improve rapidly as new firms accumulate reputation and prove that they are capable.   
Martinelli (1997) presents a model where information asymmetries in the capital market are overcome 
                                                     
1  See Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al (1994), Fairlie (1999), Quadrini (1999), 
Gentry and Hubbard (2004).     
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by reputation building, in such a way that borrowing constraints are relaxed over time. Cabral and 
Mata (2003) find that young firms’ size distribution is skewed with a long right tale, and that this 
skewness diminishes with firm age in accordance with a theoretical model with decreasing financial 
constraints over time. On the other hand, the ease of capital constraints during the first years of 
operation is only one of several possible reasons for the observed decrease in skewness. From a 
practical point of view, it is self-evident that it takes some time for a new firm to introduce itself to the 
market, build up a customer base and push the sales. New firms that are founded by inexperienced 
entrepreneurs may have a large learning potential and may therefore improve their performance 
rapidly in the first years of operation compared to firms with more efficient entrepreneurs. Using 
survey data where firms report their financial problems, Angelini and Generale (2008) observe similar 
effects as Cabral and Mata (2003). Nevertheless, relatively few firms in their data set report that they 
are constrained. Based on the subsample of self-reported unconstrained firms they conclude that 
financial constraints cannot be a very important explanation for the observed evolution of the firm size 
distribution (FSD). 
 
This study departs from previous studies by applying a broader set of empirical tools and by its rich 
micro data on corporations and owners. Using a data set from 2001 to 2009 on entrepreneurial firms 
and their individual founders, we follow new firms established between 2001 and 2005 during their 
first 5 years of operation. These data consist of accounts and balance sheets for corporations, 
ownership information from the central shareholder register, socio-demographic data, and data on 
owners’ income and wealth from the national income register and education data from a national 
education database.  
 
Our findings suggest that founders’ initial wealth and income are important determinants of firm start-
up size but not so important for the increase in assets after start-up. Gender affects both start-up size 
and growth, with a positive coefficient for male founders. The effect on growth of being male founder 
is much stronger for the larger firms. We also find that small firms grow faster than larger firms and 
that there is a remarkable strong degree of mobility among young firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 our empirical strategy is outlined. In section 
3 our empirical findings are presented and section 4 concludes. The data are described in the data 
appendix. 
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2. Empirical strategy 
To avoid confusing new start-ups with spinoffs from existing firms, we exclude indirectly held firms 
from our sample. We also restrict the definition of an entrepreneur to owner-managers in closely held 
firms that i) have not previously been registered and active as a corporate or non-corporate firm, ii) 
have a maximum of ten owners and iii) where the entrepreneur holds more than 50% of the firm. We 
thus consider an entrepreneur to be a person, a founder of a new firm and as having a central role in 
the business.  
 
Among the references mentioned above, the studies by Cabral and Mata (2003), henceforth CM, and 
Angelini and Generale (2008) have particular relevance for our study. Using a two-period framework, 
CM assumes that firms are financially constrained in the first period but not in the second period. 
Efficiency, θ, is assumed to be constant over time. In the first period, the distribution of firms size is 
given by s=min{s*(θ) ,w(z)), where s* is the optimal size given the efficiency of the entrepreneur and 
w is the maximum size allowed by the entrepreneur’s wealth, z. In the second period the distribution of 
firm size is given by s*(θ). Among the small firms in period one, some are small because of binding 
financial constraints while some are small because of low efficiency. Thus, when financial constraints 
cease to be binding, more firms will move upwards from the lower part of the FSD. By estimating the 
FSD by non-parametric methods CM finds that the distribution is skewed to the left at start-up but 
evolving toward a more symmetric distribution over time. Using regressions on a sample of 515 
surviving firms over a 7-year period, they also find empirical support for the view that financial 
constraints matters for start-up size but not for the size distribution at t+6. Relaxation of financial 
constraints over time can explain the observed evolution of the FSD.  
 
CM uses age as a proxy for liquidity constraints but the authors admit that age would also be a proxy 
for efficiency, reflecting labour market experience. CM argues that if the effect of age on size declines 
over time, this is most likely due to relaxed financing constraints but admits that it cannot be ruled out 
that the trend in FSD can be driven by other factors. As we briefly mentioned above, firms that are 
more efficient at start-up and begin with a large scale may loose their advantage over time due to 
learning by the less efficient firms. We know of no empirical studies on such effects, although 
Angelini and Generale (2008), who find a similar negative relation between financial constraints and 
firm size as CM, conclude that firms that report financial constraints are far too few to explain the 
evolution of the FSD. However, they use a large sample of firms covering a wide age span and do not 
focus particularly on young, closely held firms or on a particular cohort.    
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2.1 The theoretical model 
The starting point for our empirical analysis is the model which was developed by Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989).  Here, individuals are assumed to have different entrepreneurial abilities and 
different levels of initial wealth. Borrowing constraints imply that the amount of capital is restricted to 
a multiple of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. This means that some households with high ability are 
prevented from starting up at the optimal scale. Since borrowing constraints force low-wealth 
entrepreneurs to start at a sub-optimal scale, this reduces their returns to entrepreneurship. Hence, 
there will be a positive correlation between the probability of starting a business and the 
entrepreneurs’ initial wealth. Also, poorer entrepreneurs may be forced to devote a larger share of their 
personal wealth to the business investment than richer entrepreneurs.  Their model also implies a 
positive correlation between star-up size and initial wealth (even if this is not a central point in their 
original paper).  
 
In order to clarify the relationship between founders’ initial wealth and start-up size, we recapitulate 
some of the implications of the model. Denote the maximum amount to be invested at start-up by k. In 
the presence of borrowing constraints, the start-up investment is some fraction λ of the entrepreneur’s 
initial wealth, z: 
 
(1) zk0 λ≤≤ . 
 
(2) 1≥λ .  
 
The entrepreneur’s net income is  
 
(3) )kz(ry)kz(rk −+=−+θ α , 
 
where θ denotes the entrepreneur’s ability, r is the interest rate and y is entrepreneurial income. 
 
Maximizing (3) with respect to capital k gives the first-order condition for an interior solution 
 
(4) rk 1 =θα −α . 
 
The optimal (non-constrained) start-up capital is  
 
8 
(5) 
( )α−


 θα
=
1
1
*
r
k  
 
The firm’s start-up size, given that entry into entrepreneurship is chosen, is then 
 
(6) )k,zmin(k *λ= . 
 
When the future entrepreneur is fully aware of the payouts from entrepreneurship or on the other hand 
hired work, she will choose to start business if  
 
(7) rzw)kz(rk +≥−+θ α . 
 
The higher the wage income, w, the higher ability is required to become an entrepreneur.  
 
From (5) and from (6) we see that start-up size may depend on wealth (constrained entrepreneurs) and 
on ability (unconstrained entrepreneurs).  Also, both the relaxation of financial constraints and an 
increase in θ, reflecting increased productivity, will lead to growth in k over time. 
Gender 
Entrepreneurship appears to be selective, as males are over-represented among entrepreneurs. Indeed, 
this is also true for entrepreneurship in Norway. There may also be differences between male and 
female entrepreneurs regarding the scale of operation and the access to financing. Verheul and Thurik 
(2001) examine the role of gender for start up size and type of financing and find that gender matters 
for size but not for the composition of the way businesses are financed. In our study, we use gender 
among the explanatory variable and also present descriptive evidence of differences in income and 
wealth between male and female entrepreneurs. 
2.2 Empirical specifications 
Similar to CM, we assume that if financial constraints are more frequent at start-up than later, more 
firms will move upwards from the lower part of the FSD than if all firms start at their optimal size. 
Small firms would on average show higher growth and the effect of the owner’s wealth on start-up 
size should be stronger than its effect on growth (when controlling for its initial effect on start-up 
size).  
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Our investigation departs from CM and others by having more detailed information about the firms’ 
founders. By matching individual data with accounts data for firms via the central shareholder register, 
we are able to utilize information not only about the founder’s age but also initial wealth, wage 
income, education and household size. Of course, better data facilitates more reliable empirical results 
but the most important improvement in this study, compared to previous studies, is the decomposition 
of asset growth and its determinants by the firms’ position in the FSD and by its source of finance. 
Similar to CM we focus on young firms, but we expand their analysis that is restricted to one specific 
cohort by looking at several cohorts. This allows us to control for the effect of time vs. age.  
Regressions  
We follow CM by estimating the effect of wealth on size at two points in time. However, rather than 
using number of employees as the dependent variable, we follow Hvide and Møen (2010) and use the 
book value of total assets. In addition, we run separate regressions with book value of debt and equity 
as dependent variables.   
 
From (7) we see that the founder’s alternative income in non-entrepreneurial activities can serve as a 
proxy for her entrepreneurial ability. Even if there may be some degree of multicollinearity between 
wealth and income, both these two variables will improve the reliability compared to the use of 
founder’s age as a proxy variable. Of course, age can have a impact on its own, and is included among 
the explanatory variables. 
 
We estimate regression models of the following types: 
 
(8) ln(assetst) = const. + α1 ln(wealtht-1) + α2 ln(incomet-1) + α3 ln(aget)  
+ α4 Dgender + α5 Deducation + et 
 
(9) ln(assetst+4) =const. + α1 ln(assetst) +α2 ln(wealtht-1) + α3 ln(incomet-1) +α4 ln(aget)  
+ α5 Dgender + α6 Deducation + et+4 
 
Age refers to the age of the entrepreneur at start-up.  The subscript t refers to the start-up year of a 
given cohort of firms, i.e., owners’ initial wealth and income is measured one year prior to start-up. In 
addition we also include owners personal debt at t-1, household size, a dummy variable for the owner 
having received an inheritance at t-1 and firm-level variables that capture the firms’ tangibility and 
borrowing capacity. The models (8) and (9) are estimated using the book value of total assets as 
dependent variable and then repeated with the book values of debt and equity as dependent variables. 
10 
Running separate regressions with debt and equity as dependent variables will reveal if there are 
systematic differences with respect to the explanatory variables’ effect on the source of financing. 
 
It follows directly that if the FSD becomes more symmetric over time as shown by previous studies, 
then small firms on average tend to grow faster than large firms (apart from possible selection effects 
from the exit process). In order to shed more light on the determinants of the size distribution of firms 
some years after start-up, we estimate (9) by means of quantile regressions in addition to OLS.   
 
Models (8) and (9) are similar to the specification used by CM, with the exception mentioned above 
that we use book value of assets as the dependent variable and include founders’ initial wealth and 
income among the explanatory variables. Moreover, while CM estimates future size without including 
the start-up size among the explanatory variables, we include start-up size in (9) in order to control for 
any wealth-induced boost of size at start-up. However, this comes at the expense of some degree of 
multicollinearity. 
 
Both sets of regressions are estimated on a balanced panel of surviving firms. We also estimated (8), 
start-up size, on the full sample of surviving and exiting firms, to check the robustness for selection 
effects. The results (not reported here) showed that the exclusion of exiting firms does not affect our 
conclusions. 
Growth and changes in the FSD 
Where is growth located and how strong is the growth rate in different parts of the FSD? How is 
growth financed? To what extent does growth imply redistribution of assets among firms and re-
ranking of firms? To answer these questions we apply three different measures to give a more 
comprehensive picture of the evolution of the firm size distribution compared to previous studies: 
 
(I) The expected growth rate in total assets, A, from t to t+4 for firms in quantile qk, decomposed by 
source of funds; debt (De), net supply of external equity (Ext) and internal supply of equity2 (Int): 
 
t
tt4t
k A
]kq)AA[(E =−
=δ +  
 
                                                     
2 Net supply of external equity is defined as new share issues minus dividends over the period t to t+4. Supply of internal 
equity is defined as the firm’s after-tax profits. 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }kqA/IntIntA/ExtExtA/DeDeE ttt4ttt4ttt4t =−+−+− +++  
 
The measure δ is the growth rates by firm size, decomposed by source of finance. It tells whether 
small firms grow more, by how much and if this growth relies primarily on the combined resources 
commanded by the owner, i.e., internal funds plus new equity beyond dividends paid, or if debt 
financing is available.  
 
(II) The ratio between a firms’ expected share of the total assets in a given cohort at time t+4, given a 
firms’ location in quantile qt =k in the start-up year t, and the firms’ expected share of the cohort’s 
total assets at t+4, given its location in the same quantile qt+4 =k at time t+4: 
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(III) The transition probabilities from quantile qk at time t to quantile qk+m at time t+4: 
 
( )kqmkqP t4tm,k =+==β +  
 
The measures δk and βk,m both measure the degree and location of mobility among firms in the same 
cohort. We focus on relative mobility, i.e. growth in small firms compared to larger firms. The δ’s 
show the degree of asset reallocation through growth, while the β’s show to what extent this 
reallocation implies re-ranking of firms. Given that all firms grow proportionally, the expectation of δk 
is one and the expectation of βk,m is zero. The empirical counterparts of these measures are the sample 
means by quantiles. For the γ’s and δ’s we report our results by vigintiles, while for the β’s we use 
deciles and quintiles. 
3. Results 
Below we present our econometric and descriptive evidence. To recapitulate, our two main research 
questions are: 
(1) How do founders’ initial wealth, income and gender affect firm size at start-up and in the subse-
quent 4 - 5 years? Are the estimated effects of the explanatory variables similar for debt and eq-
12 
uity, or different? Are the effects of the explanatory variables uniform across the firm size dis-
tribution? 
(2) To what extent do small young firms catch up with larger young firms during the first years of 
operation? 
3.1 The determinants of start-up size and growth during the first years of opera-
tion 
To examine the relation between founders’ resources and how firms develop over the first 5 - 6 years, 
we run regressions on the models (8) and (9) using a log-linear specification, similar to previous 
studies.3 The results of these regressions are summarised in tables 1 to 5. As dependent variables, we 
consider the following set of accounting variables: total assets, debt and total equity. The independent 
variables are the logs of founders’ wealth one year prior to start-up, founders’ salaries one year and 
two years prior to start up plus dummy variables for gender, education and household size.  
 
Similar to previous empirical research4, we find a positive correspondence between founders’ initial 
wealth and start-up size of entrepreneurial firms (table 1). The estimated parameters are roughly 
similar for debt, equity and total assets. The effect of initial income is also positive and significant. To 
the extent that wage can serve as a proxy for non-entrepreneurial earnings, this indicates that ability 
matters, cf. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and condition (7). The dummy variable for male entrepreneur 
is also positive and clearly significant. 
 
In model (9) we aim at measuring the elasticity of assets at t+4 with respect to variation in start-up size 
at t and the entrepreneurs’ initial wealth, income etc. However, the results in table 1 imply that start-up 
size is correlated with some of the other explanatory variables, in particular wealth. In other words, 
there will be some multicollinearity involved. In order to indicate how much multicollinearity may 
affect the results, we show in table 2 how sensitive the key parameters are for different specifications, 
by including/excluding wealth and start-up size. It appears that the estimated elasticity of size at t+4 
with respect to start-up size is not very sensitive for the inclusion/exclusion of initial wealth among the 
explanatory variables. By contrast, wealth has a positive and strong effect on size at t+4 when start-up-
size is omitted but a much smaller partial effect on its own, when we control for its indirect effect via 
start-up size at t. This has some implications for the interpretation of the quantile regressions below.    
                                                     
3 Cabal and Mata (2003), Angelini and Generale (2008). The specifications are quite similar to regressions by Hvide and 
Møen (2010) on Norwegian data, with the extension that we also follow firms some years after start-up. 
4 Cabal and Mata (2003) measure size by the number of employees, which is not directly comparable. Hvide and Møen 
(2010) find somewhat higher wealth elasticity.     
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In tables 3 to 5 we examine the effects on growth more closely by estimating the effect of the 
explanatory variables using both OLS and quantile regressions. The quantile regressions show that the 
elasticity of assets at t+4 with respect to changes in start-up size at t decreases strongly with the size of 
the dependent variable, indicating that the largest firms at t+4 have experienced less growth than the 
smaller firms, after controlling for the owner’s resources. The effect of initial wealth is positive but 
small when we control for start-up size, however slightly higher in the lowest decile than for the rest 
of the firms. The effect of being male entrepreneur is strongly increasing with the size of the 
dependent variable, for all sources of finance. 
 
The overall impression from the results in tables 1 – 5 is that initial wealth has a clear positive effect 
on start-up size. The estimated effects are of the same magnitude for debt and for equity. Apart from 
the effects via start-up size, initial wealth has a smaller effect on size at t+4 than on size at t, however 
it is still significant. Being a male entrepreneur has a positive effect on the firms’ start-up size as well 
as its size at t+4. “Male” has a stronger effect on size, the higher position in the FSD at t+4. 
 
An interesting finding is that firms’ tangibility, measured by the share of fixed assets in the balance 
sheet, has a positive impact on start-up size but a negative effect on size at t+4 (when controlling for 
start-up size). The reason for this could be that firms that invest in fixed assets get access to financing 
at start-up through collateral and thus need not grow that much, while firms that rely on non-tangible 
assets must prove themselves worthy before they can get a loan and thus have a delayed path toward 
the optimal size. The strong negative effect of tangibles is particularly evident for the upper pert in the 
firm size distribution. 
3.2 Growth, equalization over time and mobility 
Based on the estimated elasticities of size at t+4 from the quantile regressions, it appears that the large 
firms at t+4 may have experienced slower growth than smaller firms. In tables 6 to 12 we report the 
results from a closer examination of the location and financing of growth, based on their ranking at 
start-up. 
 
Table 6 shows that for every cohort in our sample there is a positive, but rapidly decreasing correlation 
between a firm’s rank in the start-up year t and its rank in the following years. This is an indication of 
substantial economic mobility among young firms. However, the rank correlation coefficient, which 
summarizes changes in the entire distribution, says little about the location of mobility, as opposed to 
δ and β.  
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Tables 7 to 11 show the distribution of the asset growth decomposed by source for firms ranked 
according to their size by total assets at start-up, the δ’s. 
 
Relative growth is clearly largest for the smallest firms. A large share of this growth is financed by 
borrowing, in particular among firms in the lowest 2 – 3 deciles. Net capital injections from 
shareholders are negative, i.e., on average dividends exceed new share issues during the first 5 years of 
operation. 
 
For all cohorts, there is a very strong and clear tendency that the growth in small firms is 
disproportionally large. This implies that the smallest firms at t should increase their share of total 
assets at t+4. This is confirmed by table 12 where we show the estimated γ’s by quantile. On average, 
all firms below the median at t increase their share of total assets at t+4. The average increase is larger 
the lower the quantile and the tendency is the same for all cohorts. The share of total assets at t+4 held 
by firms located in the second vignintile at t is around twice as large as the share of total assets they 
would have controlled, if they had remained in the same vignintile. For the lowest 5 percent, the ratio 
is even bigger.  
 
In tables 13 to 18 we demonstrate by the β-indicator that the disproportional growth leads to a strong 
degree of re-ranking of firms. Around 65-70 percent of the firms in the lowest decile and around half 
the firms in the lowest quintile move to a higher quantile within the first 5 years of operation. Also, 
firms in the second decile and the second quintile have a much higher propensity to move up than to 
move down.  
 
The results shown in tables 12 to 18 demonstrate a strikingly high degree of mobility among young 
firms during the first 5 years of operation and our regressions indicate that owner’s wealth is more 
important for size at start-up than for size at t+4 . The equalisation of firm size over time observed by 
CM and others do not only imply a narrowing of the differences in size, but also a re-ranking of firms.  
 
These results are consistent with the view that the smallest firms start up at a sub-optimal scale and 
thus experience a rapid growth in the following years. The results also indicate that some new firms 
may be small because of borrowing constraints but that the capital market is willing to finance these 
firms with loans within a rather short time after start-up.  
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3.3 Tables 
Table 1. The determinants of start-up size. OLS 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables 
Total assets Debt Equity 
Initial wealth 0,13* 0,13* 0,15* 
Initial income 0,02** 0,02** 0,02*** 
Owner age -0,00** -0,00** -0,00*** 
Education, upper secondary, basic 0,03 0,03 -0,03 
Education, upper secondary, final -0,08*** -0,09** -0,08*** 
Education, post-secondary -0,12*** -0,14*** -0,12 
Education, tertiary, undergraduate 0,04 0,04 -0,01 
Education, tertiary, graduate -0,00 -0,10 0,01 
Education, PhD -0,16 -0,25 0,17 
Male 0,18* 0,17* 0,21* 
Number of persons in the household -0,03* -0,03* -0,03** 
Inheritance dummy 0,06 0,07 -0,03 
Owner's initial debt -0,00 0,00 -0,02*** 
Firm's tangibility 0,24* 0,42* -0,18** 
Firm's financial strength -0,01 -0,02 0,04 
Year dummy for 2001 -0,08*** -0,08 -0,09*** 
Year dummy for 2002 0,00 0,02 0,03 
Year dummy for 2004 0,03 0,07 -0,02 
Year dummy for 2005 -0,03 -0,10** 0,33* 
Constant 6,27* 6,07* 4,44* 
Adjusted R-squared 0,08 0,07 0,08 
Number of observations 3611 3611 3182 
* = significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 10 percent 
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Table 2. The direct and indirect effect of initial wealth on size at t+4   
All owners Male owners Female owners Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory  
variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Initial wealth  - 0,17* 0,06* -  0,19* 0,06*  - 0,09* 0,04***
Total assets at t 0,78*  - 0,75* 0,77*  - 0,75* 0,82* -  0,79* 
Adjusted R-squared 0,38 0,08 0,38 0,36 0,06 0,36 0,40 0,03 0,41 
Total assets 
at t+4 
 Number of observations 3043 3037 3037 2500 2495 2495 543 542 542 
Initial wealth  - 0,13* 0,04*  - 0,15* 0,04*  - 0,06** 0,02 
Total debt at t 0,70*  - 0,69* 0,70* -  0,69* 0,71**  - 0,70* 
Adjusted R-squared 0,36 0,05 0,36 0,34 0,04 0,34 0,39 0,02 0,39 
Debt at t+4 
 
 Number of observations 3027 3021 3021 2487 2482 2482 540 539 539 
Initial wealth  - 0,21* 0,12* -  0,23* 0,14*  - 0,13* 0,05 
Total equity at t 0,59*  - 0,54* 0,59* -  0,54* 0,58* -  0,56 
Adjusted R-squared 0,25 0,10 0,26 0,23 0,09 0,25 0,20 0,03 0,20 
Equity at t+4 
 
 Number of observations 2437 2636 2432 2035 2191 2030 402 445 402 
* = significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 10 percent 
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Table 3. Determinants of size at t+4. Total assets 
Quantile regressions 
Explanatory variables 
0.05  0.10  0.25  0.50  0.075  0.90  0.95 
OLS 
Total assets at t 1,03 0,97 0,98 0,92 0,80 0,66 0,61 0,75* 
Initial wealth 0,08 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,06* 
Initial income 0,08 0,08 0,01 -0,03 -0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,04* 
Owner age 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01* 
Education, upper secondary, basic -0,09 -0,06 -0,01 0,02 0,01 0,09 0,13 0,01 
Education, upper secondary, final 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 -0,04 0,02 
Education, post-secondary 0,04 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,12 0,10 0,10 
Education, tertiary, undergraduate -0,05 0,00 -0,01 0,03 0,12 0,20 0,21 0,11*** 
Education, tertiary, graduate -0,01 -0,03 -0,01 0,05 0,10 0,06 -0,02 0,02 
Education, PhD -0,26 -0,07 -0,04 0,01 -0,02 -0,08 0,49 -0,25 
Male 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,10 0,26 0,32 0,41 0,22* 
Number of persons in the household 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,02** 
Inheritance dummy -0,85 -0,44 -0,09 -0,04 0,18 0,10 0,41 -0,09 
Owner's initial debt -0,03 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 
Firm's tangibility -0,02 -0,03 -0,05 -0,06 -0,15 -0,18 -0,16 -0,21* 
Firm's financial strength 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 
Year dummy for 2002 0,54 0,33 0,13 0,02 -0,09 -0,12 -0,13 0,21* 
Year dummy for 2003 0,54 0,33 0,10 -0,04 -0,11 0,08 0,12 0,34* 
Year dummy for 2004 0,63 0,40 0,10 -0,06 -0,12 -0,02 0,04 0,35* 
Year dummy for 2005 0,77 0,51 0,15 -0,05 -0,08 0,02 0,13 0,37* 
Constant -2,26 -1,18 -0,10 1,12 2,66 3,98 4,40 1,60* 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0,38 0,42 0,47 0,45 0,39 0,34 0,33 0,38 
Number of observations 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 6432 3037 
* = significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 10 percent 
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Table 4. Determinants of size at t+4. Debt 
Quantile regressions 
Explanatory variables 
 0.05  0.10  0.25  0.50  0.075  0.90  0.95 
OLS 
Total debt at t 0,93 0,93 0,96 0,91 0,79 0,66 0,58 0,69* 
Initial wealth 0,07 0,04 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04* 
Initial income 0,10 0,08 0,03 -0,02 -0,04 -0,02 0,03 0,04* 
Owner age 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,00* 
Education, upper secondary, basic -0,05 -0,05 -0,04 0,01 0,03 0,10 0,08 -0,07 
Education, upper secondary, final 0,04 0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,04 0,02 -0,04 0,00 
Education, post-secondary -0,05 -0,16 -0,04 -0,02 0,05 0,16 0,13 -0,01 
Education, tertiary, undergraduate -0,13 -0,08 -0,03 0,02 0,08 0,17 0,16 -0,00 
Education, tertiary, graduate -0,36 -0,21 -0,08 0,01 0,07 0,05 -0,03 -0,20** 
Education, PhD -0,83 -0,81 -0,11 -0,05 -0,12 -0,24 -0,25 -0,60* 
Male -0,06 0,01 0,02 0,09 0,22 0,35 0,40 0,15* 
Number of persons in the household 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 
Inheritance dummy -0,16 -0,40 -0,26 -0,01 0,14 0,59 0,53 -0,12 
Owner's initial debt 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Firm's tangibility 0,20 0,07 0,00 -0,08 -0,11 -0,11 -0,10 -0,14*** 
Firm's financial strength -0,03 0,01 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,04 0,00 0,02 
Year dummy for 2002 0,56 0,30 0,07 0,01 -0,06 -0,10 -0,14 0,13** 
Year dummy for 2003 0,54 0,32 0,06 -0,01 -0,07 0,05 0,17 0,22* 
Year dummy for 2004 0,63 0,32 0,10 -0,03 -0,11 -0,06 -0,01 0,19* 
Year dummy for 2005 0,66 0,48 0,14 -0,02 -0,07 0,01 0,04 0,18* 
Constant -1,58 -0,72 0,00 1,18 2,71 4,05 4,43 2,14* 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0,33 0,38 0,44 0,44 0,38 0,32 0,30 0,36 
Number of observations 6390 6390 6390 6390 6390 6390 6390 3021 
* = significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 10 percent 
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Table 5. Determinants of size at t+4. Equity 
Quantile regressions 
Explanatory variables 
0.05  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.075 0.90 0.95 
 OLS 
Total equity at t 0,94 0,96 0,99 0,84 0,61 0,49 0,42 0,54* 
Initial wealth 0,13 0,04 0,01 0,04 0,08 0,11 0,15 0,12* 
Initial income 0,15 0,09 -0,01 -0,08 -0,05 -0,04 -0,02 0,06* 
Owner age 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,00 
Education, upper secondary, basic 0,09 0,03 0,00 0,07 0,14 -0,05 -0,16 0,00 
Education, upper secondary, final 0,26 0,07 0,00 0,03 0,05 -0,03 -0,23 0,05 
Education, post-secondary 0,22 0,04 0,02 0,10 0,07 0,06 -0,14 0,05 
Education, tertiary, undergraduate 0,14 0,06 0,01 0,10 0,23 0,20 0,06 0,17** 
Education, tertiary, graduate 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,11 0,19 0,24 0,04 0,09 
Education, PhD -0,63 -0,17 -0,07 0,05 0,25 0,09 0,26 -0,62** 
Male 0,08 0,06 0,02 0,19 0,29 0,33 0,23 0,24* 
Number of persons in the household 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,02 -0,01 0,02*** 
Inheritance dummy -0,55 -0,20 -0,06 -0,16 -0,05 -0,22 -0,12 -0,27 
Owner's initial debt -0,03 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 
Firm's tangibility 0,09 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,04 -0,03 -0,05 0,00 
Firm's financial strength -0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 -0,02 
Year dummy for 2002 0,51 0,32 0,03 -0,01 -0,11 -0,08 -0,11 0,25* 
Year dummy for 2003 0,43 0,26 0,01 -0,11 -0,10 0,07 0,11 0,37* 
Year dummy for 2004 0,56 0,34 0,01 -0,15 -0,13 0,05 0,09 0,43* 
Year dummy for 2005 0,62 0,43 0,03 -0,10 0,02 0,14 0,09 0,39* 
Constant -2,57 -1,20 0,10 1,73 3,50 4,48 5,26 1,81* 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0,37 0,40 0,42 0,36 0,29 0,26 0,26 0,26 
Number of observations 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 2432 
* = significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 10 percent 
Table 6. Spearman’s rank correlation for firms by cohort 
Start-up year (t) 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
2001 
N=904             0.90              0.83              0.78              0.71  
2002 
N=992             0.89              0.81              0.73              0.67  
2003 
N=949             0.86              0.74              0.69              0.61  
2004 
N=1051             0.84              0.77              0.69              0.65  
2005 
N=1138             0.86              0.74              0.68              0.65  
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Table 7. Sources of growth from t to t+4 by quantiles (δk). 2001 
Quantile Mean(Δdebt) Mean(Δdint) Mean(Δdext) Mean(Δtotal) 
1 (5%) 127.86 % 66.17 % -51.48 % 142.55 %
2 (10%) 173.05 % 28.66 % -41.21 % 160.49 %
3 (15%) 81.53 % 50.11 % -37.08 % 94.56 %
4 (20%) 88.09 % 87.77 % -66.19 % 109.67 %
5 (25%) 101.73 % 37.69 % -49.31 % 90.11 %
6 (30%) 118.04 % 74.16 % -48.89 % 143.31 %
7 (35%) 51.91 % 44.93 % -33.72 % 63.11 %
8 (40%) 73.77 % 63.14 % -41.37 % 95.55 %
9 (45%) 60.69 % 64.95 % -41.76 % 83.88 %
10 (50%) 70.45 % 30.28 % -22.63 % 78.10 %
11 (55%) 47.07 % 62.91 % -46.52 % 63.46 %
12 (60%) 56.43 % 52.52 % -38.05 % 70.90 %
13 (65%) 52.06 % 46.32 % -30.11 % 68.26 %
14 (70%) 40.30 % 27.60 % -19.35 % 48.55 %
15 (75%) 36.30 % 47.00 % -36.02 % 47.28 %
16 (80%) 27.94 % 42.44 % -30.84 % 39.53 %
17 (85%) 20.75 % 40.85 % -23.41 % 38.19 %
18 (90%) 14.25 % 33.26 % -14.42 % 33.09 %
19 (95%) 28.53 % 43.16 % -38.78 % 32.92 %
20 (100%) 14.26 % 40.27 % -14.77 % 39.75 %
All 34.07 % 43.36 % -26.78 % 50.65 %
Table 8. Sources of growth from t to t+4 by quantiles (δk). 2002 
Quantile Mean(Δdebt) Mean(Δdint) Mean(Δdext) Mean(Δtotal) 
1 (5%) 302.04 % 112.90 % -29.35 % 385.59 %
2 (10%) 181.84 % 30.72 % -28.49 % 184.08 %
3 (15%) 95.03 % 75.95 % -46.02 % 124.95 %
4 (20%) 148.90 % 134.39 % -90.00 % 193.28 %
5 (25%) 144.52 % 75.14 % -27.81 % 191.85 %
6 (30%) 88.92 % 109.90 % -41.94 % 156.89 %
7 (35%) 116.31 % 70.30 % -46.81 % 139.79 %
8 (40%) 95.57 % 59.27 % -28.96 % 125.87 %
9 (45%) 148.79 % 47.09 % -29.39 % 166.49 %
10 (50%) 102.37 % 57.38 % -29.20 % 130.55 %
11 (55%) 79.38 % 40.78 % -16.75 % 103.41 %
12 (60%) 69.86 % 73.30 % -45.22 % 97.95 %
13 (65%) 18.27 % 65.76 % -37.35 % 46.68 %
14 (70%) 62.93 % 45.60 % -31.91 % 76.62 %
15 (75%) 41.65 % 63.79 % -34.47 % 70.97 %
16 (80%) 22.46 % 53.39 % -28.21 % 47.65 %
17 (85%) 32.43 % 27.40 % -13.19 % 46.64 %
18 (90%) 48.10 % 50.01 % -29.06 % 69.05 %
19 (95%) 38.40 % 38.02 % -22.68 % 53.73 %
20 (100%) 17.16 % 29.41 % -19.09 % 27.49 %
All 48.31 % 46.07 % -26.44 % 67.94 %
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Table 9. Sources of growth from t to t+4 by quantiles (δk). 2003 
Quantile Mean(Δdebt) Mean(Δdint) Mean(Δdext) Mean(Δtotal) 
1 (5%) 193.77 % 90.68 % -14.68 % 269.77 %
2 (10%) 262.78 % 68.76 % -17.68 % 313.85 %
3 (15%) 208.94 % 71.18 % -13.57 % 266.56 %
4 (20%) 219.08 % 115.69 % -60.35 % 274.43 %
5 (25%) 181.89 % 214.26 % -36.89 % 359.26 %
6 (30%) 130.83 % 38.80 % -2.32 % 167.30 %
7 (35%) 94.17 % 86.39 % -33.75 % 146.82 %
8 (40%) 96.63 % 85.37 % -25.33 % 156.66 %
9 (45%) 141.34 % 64.86 % -23.73 % 182.46 %
10 (50%) 110.66 % 59.92 % -21.10 % 149.47 %
11 (55%) 135.35 % 36.10 % -7.71 % 163.74 %
12 (60%) 68.65 % 86.57 % -40.88 % 114.34 %
13 (65%) 43.84 % 48.48 % -23.88 % 68.45 %
14 (70%) 80.26 % 72.36 % -33.06 % 119.56 %
15 (75%) 33.91 % 58.46 % -34.56 % 57.81 %
16 (80%) 70.21 % 41.90 % -18.95 % 93.16 %
17 (85%) 42.94 % 33.91 % -11.63 % 65.22 %
18 (90%) 75.00 % 43.17 % -17.43 % 100.74 %
19 (95%) 33.05 % 43.97 % -21.29 % 55.72 %
20 (100%) 63.21 % 71.86 % -39.70 % 95.37 %
All 74.30 % 62.07 % -28.16 % 108.21 %
Table 10. Sources of growth from t to t+4 by quantiles (δk). 2004 
Quantile Mean(Δdebt) Mean(Δdint) Mean(Δdext) Mean(Δtotal) 
1 (5%) 547.97 % 90.45 % -29.94 % 608.48 %
2 (10%) 257.92 % 104.31 % -38.37 % 323.86 %
3 (15%) 163.35 % 71.01 % -37.84 % 196.52 %
4 (20%) 76.65 % 64.54 % -24.77 % 116.43 %
5 (25%) 76.16 % 79.20 % -28.63 % 126.73 %
6 (30%) 109.91 % 94.77 % -22.80 % 181.88 %
7 (35%) 138.02 % 105.17 % -34.75 % 208.44 %
8 (40%) 79.67 % 39.51 % -15.62 % 103.57 %
9 (45%) 110.02 % 100.26 % -26.84 % 183.44 %
10 (50%) 41.40 % 66.03 % -22.86 % 84.57 %
11 (55%) 142.90 % 48.04 % -4.20 % 186.75 %
12 (60%) 46.40 % 47.49 % -13.23 % 80.65 %
13 (65%) 88.94 % 67.43 % -24.11 % 132.26 %
14 (70%) 42.77 % 50.42 % -23.68 % 69.51 %
15 (75%) 82.59 % 99.17 % -17.90 % 163.86 %
16 (80%) 30.44 % 53.91 % -27.18 % 57.16 %
17 (85%) 39.07 % 51.28 % -13.02 % 77.33 %
18 (90%) 14.14 % 52.37 % -21.75 % 44.77 %
19 (95%) 7.34 % 35.85 % -16.41 % 26.79 %
20 (100%) 49.47 % 49.13 % -13.71 % 84.89 %
All 56.92 % 56.87 % -18.50 % 95.29 %
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Table 11. Sources of growth from t to t+4 by quantiles (δk). 2005 
Quantile Mean(Δdebt) Mean(Δdint) Mean(Δdext) Mean(Δtotal) 
1 (5%) 172.28 % 106.37 % -6.64 % 272.00 %
2 (10%) 228.01 % 87.11 % -10.31 % 304.81 %
3 (15%) 217.74 % 97.64 % -37.98 % 277.39 %
4 (20%) 110.45 % 57.10 % -37.49 % 130.05 %
5 (25%) 140.60 % 99.51 % -6.43 % 233.68 %
6 (30%) 136.76 % 68.24 % -20.93 % 184.07 %
7 (35%) 98.57 % 93.44 % -43.36 % 148.65 %
8 (40%) 104.55 % 74.58 % -25.77 % 153.36 %
9 (45%) 63.80 % 108.26 % -36.74 % 135.33 %
10 (50%) 92.37 % 95.40 % -34.67 % 153.10 %
11 (55%) 67.35 % 86.25 % -38.38 % 115.22 %
12 (60%) 66.47 % 80.55 % -28.32 % 118.69 %
13 (65%) 68.99 % 74.59 % -30.47 % 113.10 %
14 (70%) 61.43 % 69.13 % -21.01 % 109.56 %
15 (75%) 65.32 % 64.04 % -24.33 % 105.04 %
16 (80%) 52.00 % 42.56 % -20.93 % 73.63 %
17 (85%) 42.21 % 47.09 % -18.40 % 70.90 %
18 (90%) 43.90 % 56.40 % -18.06 % 82.24 %
19 (95%) 30.18 % 57.54 % -22.79 % 64.92 %
20 (100%) 26.73 % 46.50 % -15.10 % 58.13 %
All 54.24 % 60.75 % -21.60 % 93.40 %
Table 12. The ratio between firms’ share of the cohorts’ total assets at t+4, contingent on rank-
ing at t, and their share of total assets at t+4, contingent on the ranking at t+4 (γk). 
By vignintile 
Quantiles 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1 (5%) 1.45 3.49 2.14 3.23 2.27
2 (10%) 1.78 2.09 1.86 2.25 2.06
3 (15%) 1.34 1.36 2.26 1.62 2.08
4 (20%) 1.51 1.64 1.40 1.19 1.20
5 (25%) 1.24 1.93 1.70 1.31 1.87
6 (30%) 1.64 1.39 0.96 1.64 1.70
7 (35%) 1.06 1.44 1.21 1.52 1.29
8 (40%) 1.23 1.35 1.35 1.02 1.37
9 (45%) 1.19 1.67 0.99 1.29 1.31
10 (50%) 1.03 1.46 0.89 1.27 1.36
11 (55%) 1.26 1.15 1.21 1.04 1.11
12 (60%) 1.07 1.24 1.34 1.24 1.12
13 (65%) 1.23 0.86 0.88 0.93 1.07
14 (70%) 1.02 1.01 1.05 0.95 1.05
15 (75%) 0.86 0.96 0.76 1.38 1.15
16 (80%) 1.00 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.91
17 (85%) 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.87 0.95
18 (90%) 0.88 0.98 1.00 0.72 1.00
19 (95%) 0.92 0.89 0.67 0.65 0.84
20 (100%) 0.92 0.76 1.00 0.94 0.74
 
23 
Table 13. Transitions from t to t+4 by deciles (βk). 2001 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.39 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.01 - 0.03 - - 
2 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 - 
3 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 
4 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 - 
5 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.02 
6 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.06 
7 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.08 
8 0.04 - 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.07 
9 - 0.03 - 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.14 
10 - - - 0.01 - 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.60 
Table 14. Transitions from t to t+4 by deciles (βk). 2002 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.39 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
2 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.04 - 0.01 
3 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 
4 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 
5 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 
6 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.04 
7 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.04 
8 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.08 
9 - 0.03 - 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.17 
10 0.01 - - - - 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.52 
Table 15. Transitions from t to t+4 by deciles (βk). 2003 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.30 0.18 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 
2 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.01 
3 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 
4 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 
5 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 
6 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.05 
7 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.05 
8 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.10 
9 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.14 
10 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.49 
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Table 16. Transitions from t to t+4 by decile (βk)s. 2004 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.36 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01 
2 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 - 
3 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 - 
4 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.02 
5 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 
6 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 
7 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.07 
8 0.02 - 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.12 
9 0.02 - 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.14 
10 0.01 0.01 - - 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.47 
Table 17. Transitions from t to t+4 by deciles (βk). 2005 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 - 
2 0.20 0.27 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.10 - 0.01 
3 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 
4 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 
5 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.02 
6 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.04 
7 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.04 
8 0.06 0.03 - 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12 
9 - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 
10 0.01 - - 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.28 0.50 
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Table 18. Transitions from t to t+4 by quintiles (βk). 2001-2005 
From\To 1 2 3 4 5
2001      
1      0.52       0.27       0.14       0.06       0.01  
2      0.27       0.33       0.22       0.13       0.05  
3      0.16       0.26       0.27       0.20       0.12  
4      0.05       0.12       0.31       0.33       0.20  
5      0.02       0.02       0.07       0.29       0.61  
2002      
1      0.49       0.27       0.14       0.08       0.03  
2      0.25       0.28       0.25       0.16       0.07  
3      0.17       0.26       0.27       0.17       0.13  
4      0.07       0.17       0.28       0.30       0.17  
5      0.02       0.03       0.07       0.29       0.59  
2003      
1      0.42       0.27       0.13       0.12       0.06  
2      0.29       0.30       0.24       0.11       0.07  
3      0.18       0.27       0.29       0.13       0.12  
4      0.08       0.14       0.25       0.33       0.21  
5      0.03       0.03       0.09       0.31       0.54  
2004      
1      0.48       0.28       0.11       0.08       0.05  
2      0.33       0.28       0.22       0.12       0.06  
3      0.14       0.30       0.29       0.17       0.11  
4      0.07       0.14       0.29       0.28       0.23  
5      0.02       0.03       0.10       0.34       0.51  
2005      
1      0.52       0.25       0.12       0.10       0.02  
2      0.30       0.38       0.13       0.13       0.06  
3      0.10       0.23       0.35       0.21       0.12  
4      0.09       0.13       0.30       0.29       0.19  
5      0.01       0.01       0.11       0.27       0.59  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Similar to several previous studies, our empirical evidence shows that the founders’ initial wealth has 
some positive effect on the start-up size of entrepreneurial firms. This could possibly indicate 
borrowing constraints. There is a tendency that the correlation between initial wealth and size 
continues during the first years of operation but apart from the effect of the immediate boost at start-
up, the importance of the owner’s wealth for firm size is much weaker after some years.   
 
By means of quantile regressions and quantile decomposition of growth we document that small firms 
grow much faster than larger firms. Also, some of the determinants of future size have different effects 
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depending on where firms are located in the FSD; tangibility has a positive effect on start-up size, but 
a negative effect on size at t+4, in particular for large firms. Even if collateral matters for start-up size, 
it appears that high growth relative to start-up size is associated with a low share of fixed assets and a 
location in the lower part of the FSD. The positive effect of male entrepreneur on size at t+4 is 
increasing in firm size. 
 
While internal funds and borrowing on average are roughly equally important as sources of growth in 
the balance sheets when we consider the entire sample of firms, debt is far more important for the 
group of small firms. Thus, irrespective of what causes the observed effect of wealth on start-up size, 
it appears that any constraints on borrowing at start-up to a large extent are overcome during the first 5 
years of operation. We also demonstrate that the disproportional growth of the smaller firms implies a 
high degree of re-ranking, meaning that there is a high degree of economic mobility among 
entrepreneurial firms.  
 
The relatively strong growth of small firms is first and foremost driven by an increase in debt 
financing, showing that capital market imperfections can be overcome by the building-up of reputation 
and credibility over time. The main insight from this paper is that even if capital market imperfections 
may be constraining size at start-up, one should not underestimate the role of the banks as a provider 
of capital and the capital market’s ability to support firms once they are going. This suggests that 
government programmes to promote entrepreneurship by easing the access to financing should last as 
short as possible and concentrate on the difficult start-up phase, but leave it to the capital market to 
evaluate and finance going businesses.  
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Appendix: Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from different registers that cover the entire population of firms and owners. Below, we 
describe the different data sources and provide some descriptive statistics on the key variables. 
Data 
The Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises 
Unit: Company/enterprise of all organisational forms and establishment.  
In this register, a firm (company) is defined as “the smallest legal unit comprising all economic 
activities engaged in by one and the same owner”. A firm can consist of one or more (physical) 
establishments, which are geographically local units conducting economic activity. The register 
contains ID-number, name and address of each unit, founding date, status (sleep/active), the company 
ID of establishments and some economic information (turnover, number of employees).   
 
Account statistics 
Unit: Companies (only joint stock) 
Every joint-stock company in Norway is obliged to send in their accounts (current accounts and 
balance sheets) to a public register every year. Members of consolidated groups (subsidiaries and 
parent company) send in their own accounts. 
 
The Shareholder Register  
Unit: Individuals and companies. 
The shareholder register contains ownership data for every Norwegian joint-stock company. For the 
purpose of this paper, we have computed ultimate ownership shares on three levels of ownership: 
Direct (level 1), indirect (level 2) and indirect via two segments. This procedure ensures that we cover 
85 percent of total ownership of non-listed firms in Norway5, and captures both direct ownership as 
well as investors that operate through holding companies and investment companies.  
 
The Directorship Register  
Unit: Individuals and companies. 
The register of directorship gives information of every individual’s appointments such as member of 
the board, chairman of the board, general manager etc. In combination with ownership information 
from the shareholder register, this provides a basis for the identification of founders and insiders. 
                                                     
5 The remaining 15 percent are foreigners, institutions and individual ownership chains through more than two company 
segments 
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The Register of Employers and Employees 
Unit: Companies (all organisational forms) and individuals  
The employer-employee register contains information about each individual employee’s contract start 
and end, wages and (contractual) working hours. Each record contains an identification of employee 
and firm.  
 
The tax register for individuals 
Unit: Individuals  
The tax register gives information about taxable income and wealth based on individual tax returns. 
 
The National Education Database (register, total population) 
Unit: Individuals 
The national education database contains a six-digit number for each individual. The leading digit 
describes the educational level of the person (length of education). The remaining 5 digits describe the 
field of education.   
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Descriptive statistics 
Table A.1 Number of firms by year and gender of founder 
Start-up year Male Female Total
2001    1 046 266     1 312 
2002    1 089 272     1 361 
2003    1 027 298     1 325 
2004    1 189 299     1 488 
2005    1 217 338     1 555 
Table A.2 Firm characteristics at start-up. By year and gender 
Male Female Start-up  
year 
Total assets Debt Equity
Operating 
income Total assets Debt Equity
Operating
 income
2001.  Mean 2 467,22 2 108,27 339,17 209,66 2 008,59 1 729,99 269,20 36,43
 Median 1 212,00 1 064,50 144,50 67,00 893,50 759,50 118,50 16,50
2002.  Mean  2 025,73 1 785,58 225,59 155,59 1 590,04 1 414,05 169,33 104,99
 Median 1 133,00 994,00 146,00 86,00 873,00 735,00 115,50 34,00
2003.  Mean 2 095,48 1 811,35 284,13 233,21 1 424,64 1 275,07 149,57 86,85
 Median 1 092,00 990,00 135,00 70,00 884,50 773,00 118,00 13,50
2004.  Mean  2 230,84 1 945,47 285,67 212,35 1 239,02 1 133,52 105,64 60,04
 Median 1 223,00 1 104,00 135,00 77,00 879,00 802,00 108,00 16,00
2005.  Mean  1 980,50 1 548,64 480,74 281,63 1 219,86 1 037,07 220,43 89,43
 Median 1 107,00 888,00 217,00 99,00 821,50 690,00 159,00 24,50
Table A1. Main owner's wealth at firm start-up. By year and gender 
Start-up year Male Female
2001.    Mean      1 736,00      1 029,68 
 Median         581,01         264,19 
2002.    Mean       1 544,63      1 062,98 
 median         551,03         305,53 
2003.    Mean      1 364,64         445,58 
 Median         485,93         196,58 
2004.    Mean       1 742,93         373,75 
 Median         457,87         213,63 
2005.    Mean       1 126,80         400,00 
 Median         441,01         171,74 
Pooled mean      1 499,61         641,66 
     1 358,45         499,35 95 % Confidence intervals 
     1 640,76         783,97 
t-value for difference in means 5,93 
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Table A2. Main owner's income at firm start-up. By year and gender 
Start-up year Male Female
2001.    Mean         238,03         160,97 
 Median         242,52         155,12 
2002.    Mean          235,91         161,31 
 Median         254,90         163,47 
2003.    Mean         243,10         161,59 
 Median         264,41         173,64 
2004.    Mean          244,13         177,32 
 Median         253,08         195,25 
2005.    Mean          232,27         159,57 
 Median         233,62         164,12 
Pooled mean         238,61         164,15 
        232,61         156,77 95% Confidence intervals 
        244,60         171,52 
t-value for difference in means 11,93 
Table A.3 Owners by start-up year and education level at firm start-up. Percent 
Male Female 
Education level (years) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
No education 
 0.19 0.28 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00
Primary school  
(1-7) 0.57 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower sec  
(8-10) 19.22 18.55 17.92 18.92 16.60 17.67 20.22 24.16 21.07 23.08
Upper sec - basic  
(11-12) 17.59 16.35 15.00 14.72 11.83 24.81 19.49 20.13 15.72 14.50
Upper sec - final  
(13+) 34.32 36.82 36.90 37.93 42.07 29.32 33.09 32.21 33.11 32.84
Post-sec, non-tertiary 
 (14+) 4.68 5.14 6.33 5.47 5.09 3.01 2.57 1.68 3.68 1.18
Tertiary, undergraduate  
(14-17) 15.68 14.51 15.38 15.31 13.23 14.29 17.65 14.77 20.74 20.41
Tertiary, graduate  
(18-19) 6.41 6.70 5.84 4.54 7.56 9.02 4.78 5.70 4.01 5.92
Phd 
 0.48 0.64 0.58 0.34 0.58 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
Unknown 0.86 1.01 1.85 2.61 2.79 1.88 1.47 1.01 1.67 2.07
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